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Abstract
We consider a simple model of the choice of strategic variables under relative
profit maximization by firms in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated sub-
stitutable goods such that there are three firms, Firm 1, 2 and 3, demand functions
are linear and symmetric, marginal costs are constant, there is no fixed cost, Firm
2 and 3 have the same cost function, but Firm 1 has a different cost function. In
such a model we show that there are two pure strategy sub-game perfect equilib-
ria. One is such that all firms choose the outputs as their strategic variables, and
the other is such that Firm 2 and 3 choose the outputs as their strategic variables,
and Firm 1 chooses the price as its strategic variable.
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1 Introduction
In a symmetric duopoly with differentiated goods Tanaka (2013) has shown the fol-
lowing results.
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If firms maximize their relative profits, the choice of strategic variables,
price or output, is irrelevant to the outcome of the game in the sense that
the equilibrium outputs, prices and profits of the firms are the same in
all situations. Thus, any combination of strategy choice by the firms con-
stitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium in a two stage game such that in
the first stage the firms choose their strategic variables and in the second
stage they determine the values of their strategic variables.
Symmetry means that demand functions are symmetric and firms have the same cost
function. This conclusion can be extended to a symmetric oligopoly and an asym-
metric duopoly. But it can not be extended to an asymmetric oligopoly. Asymmetry
means that demand functions may be asymmetric or firms may have different cost
functions.
In recent years, maximizing relative profit instead of absolute profit has aroused
the interest of economists. Please see Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Lu (2011), Mat-
sumura,MatsushimaandCato (2013),Miller andPazgal (2001), Vega-Redondo (1997)
and Schaffer (1989).
In Vega-Redondo (1997), it is argued that, in a homogeneous good case, if firms
maximize their relative profits, a competitive equilibrium can be induced. But in the
case of differentiated goods, the result under relative profit maximization is different
from the competitive result.
We think that seeking for relative profit or utility is based on the nature of human.
Even if a person earns a big money, if his brother/sister or close friend earns a bigger
money than him, he is not sufficiently happy and may be disappointed. On the other
hand, even if he is very poor, if his neighbor is more poor, he may be consoled by that
fact.
In this paper we consider a simplemodel of the choice of strategic variables under
relative profit maximization by firms in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated
substitutable goods such that there are three firms, Firm 1, 2 and 3, demand functions
are linear and symmetric, marginal costs of the firms are constant, there is no fixed
cost, Firm2 and 3have the same cost function, but Firm1has a different cost function.
In such a model we show the following result.
There are two pure strategy sub-game perfect equilibria. One is such that
all firms choose the outputs as their strategic variables, and the other is
such that Firm 2 and 3 choose the outputs as their strategic variables, and
Firm 1 chooses the price as its strategic variable.
In the next section we present amodel of this paper. In Section 3 we analyze equi-
libria in the second stage of the game. In this stage (the managers of ) firms determine
the values of their strategic variables so as to maximize their relative profits. In Sec-
tion 4we investigate equilibria in the first stage of the game. In this stage the owners of
firms choose the strategic variables so as to maximize the relative profits of the firms.
In Section 5we brieflymention the results when the owners of firms seek tomaximize
the absolute profits of the firms. Miller and Pazgal (2001) presented a similar study.
They showed the equivalence of price strategy and quantity strategy in a delegation
game of a duopoly when owners of firms control managers of firms seek to maximize
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an appropriate combination of absolute and relative profits. In their model the owner
of each firmdetermines theweight on the rival firm’s profit in the objective function of
its firm. We do not consider, however, such a delegation game. In our analysis owners
of firms choose the strategic variables.
2 Themodel
There are three firms. Firm 1, 2 and 3. They produce differentiated substitutable
goods. The outputs and prices of the goods of the firms are denoted by x1, x2, x3,
p1, p2 and p3. The inverse demand functions are
p1 D a   x1   bx2   bx3; (1)
p2 D a   x2   bx1   bx3; (2)
p3 D a   x3   bx1   bx2: (3)
We assume a > 0 and 0 < b < 1.
From (2) and (3), from (1) and (3) and from (1) and (2) we have
p2 C p3 D 2a   .1C b/.x2 C x3/   2bx1;
p1 C p3 D 2a   .1C b/.x1 C x3/   2bx2;
p1 C p2 D 2a   .1C b/.x1 C x2/   2bx3:
Substituting them into (1), (2) and (3), we obtain the following ordinary demand
functions.
x1 D 1
.1   b/.1C 2b/ .1   b/a   .1C b/p1 C bp2 C bp3; (4)
x2 D 1
.1   b/.1C 2b/ .1   b/a   .1C b/p2 C bp1 C bp3; (5)
x3 D 1
.1   b/.1C 2b/ .1   b/a   .1C b/p3 C bp1 C bp2: (6)
The inverse and ordinary demand functions are symmetric.
The constant marginal costs of Firm 1, 2 and 3 are c1, c2 and c3. There is no fixed
cost. In Section 4 we assume c2 D c3 and c1 ¤ c2.
The relative profit of a firm is defined as the difference between its (absolute) profit
and the average of the (absolute) profits of the rival firms.
We consider a two stage game. In the first stage (owners of ) the firms choose their
strategic variables, price or quantity (output), and in the second stage (managers of )
the firms determine the values of their strategic variables. In Section 4 we consider
a case where owners of firms choose the strategic variables to maximize the relative
profits, and in Section 5 we briefly mention a case where owners of firms choose the
strategic variables to maximize the absolute profits.
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3 The second stage of the game
3.1 One firm is a price setting firm
In this subsection we assume that one of the firms is a price setting firm, that is, it
chooses the price as its strategic variable, and other two firms are quantity setting
firms, that is, they choose the outputs as their strategic variables. The price setting
firm is Firm 2, and the quantity setting firms are Firm 1 and 3. The output and the
price of the good of Firm 1 are denoted by x1 andp1, and so on. Theordinary demand
function for Firm 2 is
x2 D a   p2   bx1   bx3: (7)
From this and (1), (2) and (3), the inverse demand functions for Firm 1 and 3 are
derived as follows.
p1 D .1   b/aC bp2   .1   b2/x1   b.1   b/x3; (8)
and
p3 D .1   b/aC bp2   .1   b2/x3   b.1   b/x1: (9)
Denote the relative profits of Firm 1, 2 and 3 by1,2 and3. Then,
1 D.1   b/aC bp2   .1   b2/x1   b.1   b/x3x1   c1x1   1
2
f.a   p2   bx1   bx3/.p2   c2/
C.1   b/aC bp2   .1   b2/x3   b.1   b/x1x3   c3x3
	
;
2 D.a   p2   bx1   bx3/.p2   c2/   1
2

.1   b/aC bp2   .1   b2/x1   b.1   b/x3x1
 c1x1 C .1   b/aC bp2   .1   b2/x3   b.1   b/x1x3   c3x3
	
;
and
3 D.1   b/aC bp2   .1   b2/x3   b.1   b/x1x3   c3x3   1
2
f.a   p2   bx1   bx3/.p2   c2/
C.1   b/aC bp2   .1   b2/x1   b.1   b/x3x1   c1x1
	
:
The conditions of relative profit maximization for Firm 1, 2 and 3 are
.1  b/aC bp2   2.1  b2/x1   b.1  b/x3   c1   1
2
 bp2   b.1  b/x3C bc2 D 0;
a   2p2   bx1   bx3 C c2   1
2
.bx1 C bx3/ D 0;
and
.1  b/aC bp2   2.1  b2/x3   b.1  b/x1   c3   1
2
 bp2   b.1  b/x1C bc2 D 0:
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Arranging the terms,
 3bp2 C 4.1   b2/x1 C b.1   b/x3 D 2.1   b/a   2c1   bc2; (10)
4p2 C 3bx1 C 3bx3 D 2aC 2c2; (11)
 3bp2 C b.1   b/x1 C 4.1   b2/x3 D 2.1   b/a   2c3   bc2 (12)
are derived. From (10), (11), (12) we get the equilibrium price of Firm 2 and the
equilibrium outputs of Firm 1 and 3 as follows.
p
1p
2 D
.1   b/.4   b/aC .4C b   2b2/c2 C 3bc1 C 3bc3
.2C b/.4   b/ ;
x
1q
1 D
.1   b/.4   b/.4C 3b/aC b.1   b/.4C 3b/c2   .16   7b2/c1 C b.4C 5b/c3
.1   b/.2C b/.4   b/.4C 3b/ ;
and
x
1q
3 D
.1   b/.4   b/.4C 3b/aC b.1   b/.4C 3b/c2 C b.4C 5b/c1   .16   7b2/c3
.1   b/.2C b/.4   b/.4C 3b/ :
A superscript p indicates price setting firm, a superscript q indicates quantity setting
firm, and 1 indicates the case of this subsection. Assuming that c2 D c3 and c1 ¤ c2,
the relative profits of Firm 1, 2 and 3 are written as

1q
1 D
c2   c1
.1   b/.2C b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2 .256   288b
2   16b3 C 57b4   9b5/a
  .128C 64b   104b2   28b3 C 21b4/c1   .128   64b   184b2 C 12b3 C 36b4   9b5/c2;

1p
2 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2 .256   288b
2   16b3 C 57b4   9b5/a
  .128C 64b   104b2 C 8b3 C 39b4/c1   .128   64b   184b2   24b3 C 18b4   9b5/c2;

1q
3 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2 .256   288b
2   16b3 C 57b4   9b5/a
  .128C 64b   104b2   64b3 C 3b4/c1   .128   64b   184b2 C 48b3 C 54b4   9b5/c2:
If Firm 3 is a price setting firm, the relative profits of the firms are written as fol-
lows.

1q
1 D
c2   c1
.1   b/.2C b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2 .256   288b
2   16b3 C 57b4   9b5/a
  .128C 64b   104b2   28b3 C 21b4/c1   .128   64b   184b2 C 12b3 C 36b4   9b5/c2;

1q
2 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2 .256   288b
2   16b3 C 57b4   9b5/a
  .128C 64b   104b2   64b3 C 3b4/c1   .128   64b   184b2 C 48b3 C 54b4   9b5/c2;

1p
3 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2 .256   288b
2   16b3 C 57b4   9b5/a
  .128C 64b   104b2 C 8b3 C 39b4/c1   .128   64b   184b2   24b3 C 18b4   9b5/c2:
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If Firm 1 is a price setting firm, the relative profits of the firms are written as fol-
lows.

1p
1 D
.c2   c1/.16   8b C b2/a   .8C b2/c1   8.1   b/c2
.2C b/.4   b/2 ;

1q
2 D  
.c2   c1/.16   8b C b2/a   .8C b2/c1   8.1   b/c2
2.2C b/.4   b/2 ;

1q
3 D  
.c2   c1/.16   8b C b2/a   .8C b2/c1   8.1   b/c2
2.2C b/.4   b/2 :
3.2 Two firms are price setting firms
In this subsection we assume that one of the firms is a quantity setting firm, and other
two firms are price setting firms. The quantity setting firm is Firm 3 and the price
setting firms are Firm 1 and 2. The inverse demand function for Firm 3 is
p3 D 1
1C b .1   b/a   .1   b/.1C 2b/x3 C bp2 C bp1 (13)
From this and (4), (5) and (6), the ordinary demand functions for Firm 1 and 2 are
derived as follows.
x1 D 1
.1   b/.1C 2b/f.1   b/a   .1C b/p1
C b
1C b .1   b/a   .1   b/.1C 2b/x3 C bp2 C bp1C bp2g (14)
D 1
1   b2 f.1   b/a   p1 C bp2   b.1   b/x3g ;
and
x2 D 1
.1   b/.1C 2b/f.1   b/a   .1C b/p2
C b
1C b .1   b/a   .1   b/.1C 2b/x3 C bp2 C bp1C bp1g (15)
D 1
1   b2 f.1   b/a   p2 C bp1   b.1   b/x3g :
The relative profits of Firm 1, 2 and 3 are written as follows.
1 D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   p1 C bp2   b.1   b/x3 .p1   c1/
  1
2

1
1C b .1   b/a   .1   b/.1C 2b/x3 C bp2 C bp1x3   c3x3
C 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   p2 C bp1   b.1   b/x3 .p2   c2/

;
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2 D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   p2 C bp1   b.1   b/x3 .p2   c2/
  1
2

1
1C b .1   b/a   .1   b/.1C 2b/x3 C bp2 C bp1x3   c3x3
C 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   p1 C bp2   b.1   b/x3 .p1   c1/

;
and
3 D 1
1C b .1   b/a   .1   b/.1C 2b/x3 C bp2 C bp1x3   c3x3
  1
2

1
1   b2 .1   b/a   p2 C bp1   b.1   b/x3 .p2   c2/
C 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   p1 C bp2   b.1   b/x3 .p1   c1/

:
The conditions of relative profit maximization for Firm 1, 2 and 3 are
1
1   b2 .1   b/a   2p1 C bp2   b.1   b/x3 C c1 
1
2

b
1C b x3 C
b
1   b2 .p2   c2/

D 0;
1
1   b2 .1   b/a   2p2 C bp1   b.1   b/x3 C c2 
1
2

b
1C b x3 C
b
1   b2 .p1   c1/

D 0;
and
1
1C b .1   b/a   2.1   b/.1C 2b/x3 C bp2 C bp1   c3
  1
2.1   b2/  b.1   b/.p2   c2/   b.1   b/.p1   c1/ D 0:
Arranging the terms,
2.1   b/aC bp2   4p1   3b.1   b/x3 C bc2 C 2c1 D 0; (16)
2.1   b/a   4p2 C bp1   3b.1   b/x3 C 2c2 C bc1 D 0; (17)
2.1   b/2a   4.1   b/2.1C 2b/x3 C 3b.1   b/p2 C 3b.1   b/p1 (18)
  2.1   b/.1C b/c3   b.1   b/c2   b.1   b/c1 D 0
are derived. From (16), (17), (18) we get the equilibrium output of Firm 3 and the
equilibrium prices of Firm 1 and 2 as follows.
x
2q
3 D
.1   b/.4C 5b/a   .1C b/.4   b/c3 C b.1C 2b/c2 C b.1C 2b/c1
.1   b/.2C b/.4C 5b/ ;
p
2p
1 D
1
.2C b/.4C b/.4C 5b/ .1   b/.4C b/.4C 5b/aC 3b.1C b/.4C b/c3
C 3b.4C 7b C 2b2/c2 C .1C b/.16C 16b C b2/c1C c1;
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and
p
2p
2 D
1
.2C b/.4C b/.4C 5b/ .1   b/.4C b/.4C 5b/aC 3b.1C b/.4C b/c3
C .1C b/.16C 16b C b2/c2 C 3b.4C 7b C 2b2/c1C c2:
A superscript 2 indicates the case of this subsection. Assuming that c2 D c3 and
c1 ¤ c2, the relative profits of Firm 1, 2 and 3 are written as

2p
1 D
c2   c1
.1   b/.2C b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 .256C 512b   21b
2   496b3   215b4   25b5/a
  .128C 320b C 152b2   124b3   91b4   16b5/c1
  .128C 192b   184b2   372b3   124b4   9b5/c2;

2p
2 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 .256C 512b   21b
2   496b3   215b4   25b5/a
  .128C 320b C 152b2   88b3   37b4 C 2b5/c1
  .128C 192b   184b2   408b3   178b4   27b5/c2;

2q
3 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 .256C 512b   21b
2   496b3   215b4   25b5/a
  .128C 320b C 152b2   160b3   145b4   34b5/c1
  .128C 192b   184b2   336b3   70b4   9b5/c2:
If Firm 2 is a quantity setting firm, the relative profits of the firms are written as
follows.

2p
1 D
c2   c1
.1   b/.2C b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 .256C 512b   21b
2   496b3   215b4   25b5/a
  .128C 320b C 152b2   124b3   91b4   16b5/c1
  .128C 192b   184b2   372b3   124b4   9b5/c2;

2q
2 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 .256C 512b   21b
2   496b3   215b4   25b5/a
  .128C 320b C 152b2   160b3   145b4   34b5/c1
  .128C 192b   184b2   336b3   70b4   9b5/c2;

2p
3 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 .256C 512b   21b
2   496b3   215b4   25b5/a
  .128C 320b C 152b2   88b3   37b4 C 2b5/c1
  .128C 192b   184b2   408b3   178b4   27b5/c2:
If Firm 1 is a quantity setting firm, the relative profits of the firms are written as
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follows.

2q
1 D
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 .16C 24b   15b
2   25b3/a
  .8C 16b C b2   7b3/c1   2.4C 4b   8b2   9b3/c2;

2p
2 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 .16C 24b   15b
2   25b3/a
  .8C 16b C b2   7b3/c1   2.4C 4b   8b2   9b3/c2;

2p
3 D 
c2   c1
2.1   b/.2C b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 .16C 24b   15b
2   25b3/a
  .8C 16b C b2   7b3/c1   2.4C 4b   8b2   9b3/c2:
3.3 Cournot and Bertrand equilibria
Consider the Cournot equilibrium in which all firms are quantity setting firms and
the Bertrand equilibrium in which all firms are price setting firms. The equilibrium
outputs at the Cournot equilibrium are obtained as follows.
xC1 D
.4   b/a   .4C b/c1 C bc2 C bc3
.2C b/.4   b/ ;
xC2 D
.4   b/a   .4C b/c2 C bc1 C bc3
.2C b/.4   b/ ;
and
xC3 D
.4   b/a   .4C b/c3 C bc1 C bc2
.2C b/.4   b/ :
C indicates Cournot. Assuming c3 D c2 and c1 ¤ c2, the relative profits of Firm 1, 2
and 3 at the Cournot equilibrium are written as
C1 D
.c2   c1/.4   b/2a   .8C b2/c1   8.1   b/c2
.2C b/.4   b/2 ;
C2 D  
.c2   c1/.4   b/2a   .8C b2/c1   8.1   b/c2
2.2C b/.4   b/2 ;
C3 D  
.c2   c1/.4   b/2a   .8C b2/c1   8.1   b/c2
2.2C b/.4   b/2 :
The equilibrium prices at the Bertrand equilibrium are
pB1 D
.1   b/.4C 5b/aC .4C 7b C 4b2/c1 C 3b.1C b/c2 C 3b.1C b/c3
.2C b/.4C 5b/ ;
pB2 D
.1   b/.4C 5b/aC .4C 7b C 4b2/c2 C 3b.1C b/c1 C 3b.1C b/c3
.2C b/.4C 5b/ ;
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and
pB3 D
.1   b/.4C 5b/aC .4C 7b C 4b2/c3 C 3b.1C b/c1 C 3b.1C b/c2
.2C b/.4C 5b/ :
B indicates Bertrand. Assuming that c2 D c3 and c1 ¤ c2, the relative profits of Firm
1, 2 and 3 at the Bertrand equilibrium are
B1 D
.c2   c1/.16C 24b   15b2   25b3/a   .8C 16b C b2   7b3/c1   2.4C 4b   8b2   9b3/c2
.1   b/.2C b/.4C 5b/2 ;
B2 D  
.c2   c1/.16C 24b   15b2   25b3/a   .8C 16b C b2   7b3/c1   2.4C 4b   8b2   9b3/c2
2.1   b/.2C b/.4C 5b/2 ;
B3 D  
.c2   c1/.16C 24b   15b2   25b3/a   .8C 16b C b2   7b3/c1   2.4C 4b   8b2   9b3/c2
2.1   b/.2C b/.4C 5b/2 :
4 The first stage of the game
The owner of each firmmaximizes the relative profit of its firm.
4.1 The best responses of Firm 1
1. Assume that Firm 2 and 3 are quantity setting firms. Compare the relative profit
of Firm 1 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it
chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have

1p
1  C1 D  
9b3.4C b/.c2   c3/2
2.1   b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2 D 0: (19)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
2. Assume that Firm 2 and 3 are price setting firms. Compare the relative profit of
Firm 1when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it chooses
the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
B1  2q1 D  
9b3.4C 3b/.c2   c3/2
2.1   b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 D 0: (20)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
3. Assume that one of Firm 2 and 3 is a quantity setting firm and the other is a price
setting firm. Compare the relative profit of Firm 1 when it chooses the price as
a strategic variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable.
Then, we have

2p
1  1q1 D  
144b7.2C b/.c1   c2/2
.1   b/.4   b/2.4C b/2.4C 3b/2.4C 5b/2 < 0: (21)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 1.
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4.2 The best responses of Firm 2 (or 3)
The situation of Firm 2 and that of Firm 3 are symmetric.
1. Assume that Firm 1 and 3 are quantity setting firms. Compare the relative profit
of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it
chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, since c1 ¤ c2 and c2 D c3
we have

1p
2  C2 D  
9b3.4C b/.c1   c2/2
2.1   b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2 < 0: (22)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
2. Assume that Firm 1 and 3 are price setting firms. Compare the relative profit of
Firm 2when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it chooses
the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
B2  2q2 D  
9b3.4C 3b/.c1   c2/2
2.1   b/.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 < 0: (23)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
3. Assume that Firm 1 is a price setting firm and Firm 3 is a quantity setting firm.
Compare the relative profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic
variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we
have

2p
2  1q2 D  
9b3.3b3 C 12b2 C 80b C 64/.c1   c2/2
2.1   b/.4   b/2.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 < 0: (24)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
4. Assume that Firm 3 is a price setting firm and Firm 1 is a quantity setting firm.
Compare the relative profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic
variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we
have

2p
2  1q2 D
9b3.7b3   44b2   112b   64/.c1   c2/2
2.1   b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2.4C 5b/2 < 0: (25)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
4.3 Sub-game perfect equilibria
From these results we obtain the following conclusion.
Proposition 1 There are two pure strategy sub-game perfect equilibria as follows.
1. All firms choose the outputs as their strategic variables.
2. Firm 2 and 3 choose the outputs as their strategic variables, and Firm 1 chooses the
price as its strategic variable.
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4.4 A note on a symmetric case
If the oligopoly is symmetric, that is, c1 D c2 D c3, all of (21), (22), (23), (24) and (25)
are zero. Then, output and price are indifferent for all firms in all situations, and so any
combination of strategies of the firms constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
5 Absolute profit maximizing owners
It may be natural that the owners of firms seek to maximize the absolute profits of
their firms. In this section we brieflymention the results of that case. The equilibrium
outputs and prices are the same as those in the previous section. We consider the first
stage of the game.
Denote the absolute profit of Firm 1 when it is a price setting firm and other firms
are quantity setting firms by 1p1 , and so on.
5.1 The best responses of (the owner of ) Firm 1
1. Assume that Firm 2 and 3 are quantity setting firms. Compare the absolute
profit of Firm 1 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when
it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have

1p
1   C1 D 0: (26)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
2. Assume that Firm 2 and 3 are price setting firms. Compare the absolute profit of
Firm 1when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it chooses
the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
B1   2q1 D 0: (27)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
3. Assume that one of Firm 2 and 3 is a quantity setting firm and the other is a price
setting firm. Compare the absolute profit of Firm 1when it chooses the price as
a strategic variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable.
Then, we have

2p
1   1q1 D  
48b5.3b3   10b2   48b   32/.c1   c2/2
.1   b/.4   b/2.4C b/2.4C 3b/2.4C 5b/2 > 0: (28)
Thus, the price is the best response of Firm 1.
5.2 The best responses of (the owner of ) Firm 2 (or 3)
The situation of Firm 2 and that of Firm 3 are symmetric.
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1. Assume that Firm 1 and 3 are quantity setting firms. Compare the absolute
profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when
it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have

1p
2   C2 D 0: (29)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
2. Assume that Firm 1 and 3 are price setting firms. Compare the absolute profit of
Firm 2when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it chooses
the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
B2   2q2 D 0: (30)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
3. Assume that Firm 1 is a price setting firm and Firm 3 is a quantity setting firm.
Compare the absolute profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic
variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we
have

2p
2   1q2 D  
6b4.b2   24b   16/.c1   c2/2
.1   b/.4   b/2.4C b/2.4C 5b/2 > 0:
Thus, the price is the best response of Firm 2.
4. Assume that Firm 3 is a price setting firm and Firm 1 is a quantity setting firm.
Compare the absolute profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic
variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we
have

2p
2   1q2 D
6b4.9b2   8b   16/.c1   c2/2
.1   b/.4   b/2.4C 3b/2.4C 5b/2 < 0: (31)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
From these results about the model of this paper we obtain the following conclu-
sion.
Proposition 2 There are the following four pure strategy sub-game perfect equilibria.
1. All firms choose the outputs as their strategic variables.
2. All firms choose the prices as their strategic variables.
3. Firm 1 and 2 choose the prices as their strategic variables, and Firm 3 chooses the
output as its strategic variable.
4. Firm 1 and 3 choose the prices as their strategic variables, and Firm 2 chooses the
output as its strategic variable.
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6 Conclusion
We have studied the choice of strategic variables under relative profit maximization
in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated substitutable goods. We considered a
case with three firms such that two firms have the same cost functions and the other
one firmhas a different cost function, and have shown that there are two pure strategy
sub-game perfect equilibria. In duopoly and symmetric oligopoly the equivalence of
price and output strategies under relative profit maximization have been proved. In
an asymmetric oligopoly, however, they are not equivalent.
On the other hand in the last section we have shown that if the owners of firms
seek to maximize the absolute profits of their firms even though (the managers of )
firms maximize their relative profits, there are four sub-game perfect equilibria.
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